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RECENT CASES
BAILMENTS-INNKEEPER-LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE TO AUTOMOBILE OF
GuEsT-Plaintiff, a guest at defendant's inn, put his car in the garage of the inn,
which garage was open on one side. Due to a frost, the water in the engine
froze, damaging the car. Held, that defendant was not liable since he was not
negligent. Winkworth v. Raven [I93I] I K. B. 652.
From the time of Calye's Case,' English courts have held, with but one
exception, 2 that, irrespective of negligence, an innkeeper is bound to keep the
goods of his guest safely.3 He might exonerate himself only by showing that
the loss was caused by the negligence of the guest himself, 4 an Act of God, or the
Sovereign's enemies.' The court in the immediate case recognized this absolute
liability, but declared that it pertained only to losses by theft, and that in cases of
damage, negligence must be proved. This distinction is without precedent in
English law.8 And even in the United States, where the authorities are quite in
conflict,7 no such distinction is made." Yet, when the reason of the rule is con-
sidered, the distinction appears to be sound. The marauders of old, whose exist-
ence required the innkeeper to guarantee his guests an absolute protection of their
goods from robbery, 9 have given way to the less violent thieves, whose presence
and opportunities in the large hotels have made the preservation of the rule wise
and desirable. But neither reason, ancient or modern, is applicable to an absolute
liability for damage to goods. Nor does the classical argument of collusion
between innkeeper and thief have any force when the facts show a mere injury."
18 Co. 32a (584).
2 Dawson v. Chamney, 5 Q. B. 164 (1843).
'Bennett v. Mellor, 5 T. R. 273 (1793) ; Morgan v. Ravey, 6 H. & N. 265 (1861) ; Aria
v. Bridge House Hotel, Ltd., 71 Sol. J. 395, 163 L. T. 465 (1927) ; see Robins v. Gray [1895]
2 Q. B. 501, 503, 504.
' Sanders v. Spencer, 3 Dyer 266b (1.568) ; Cashill v. Wright, 6 E. & B. 891 (1856).
See Morgan v. Ravey, supra note 3, per Pollock, J., at 277.
'Dawson v. Chamney, supra note 2, cited as authority by the court in the instant case,
held that an innkeeper was not liable for an injury to a guest's horse, where the innkeeper was
not negligent. The decision was based, however, not on the fact that the wrong was an in-
jury as distinguished from a theft, but on the broader principle that an innkeeper may ex-
onerate himself by showing he was not negligent, a doctrine inconsistent with the general
rule of English authorities (supra note 3), and one that was frankly disapproved in Morgan
v. Ravey, 6 H. & N. 26.5 (I86I), and overruled in Day v. Bather, 2 H. & C. 14 (1863).
7As in England, the majority hold the innkeeper liable as an insurer. Sibley v.*Aldrich,
33 N. H. 553 (1856) ; Hulett v. Swift, 33 N. Y. 571 (1865) ; Schultz v. Wall, 134 Pa. 262,
19 Atl. 742 (i89o). The minority hold the innkeeper liable only if he fails to prove that
he was without fault. Cutler v. Bonney, 3o Mich. 259 (1874) ; Howth v. Franklin, 2o Tex.
798 (1858).
' Shaw v. Berry, 31 Me. 478 (185o) (injury to horse) ; Sibley v. Aldrich, supra note 7
(injury to horse). But cf. Johnson v. Chadbourne Furnace Co., 89 Minn. 310, 94 N. W. 874
(19o3), where the court modified the strict common law rule to relieve defendant in case of
accidental fire.
In Metcalf v. Hess, 14 Ili. 129 (1852), the court refused to hold the innkeeper liable for
the accidental death of a horse, saying, at page 130: "An innkeeper can, have no motive to
destroy the animal of his guest, and there is not the same reason for holding him responsible
at all events for such a loss as there would be . . . for the loss of goods which had dis-
appeared froin his possession; because in the latter case he may have converted the goods to
his own use, while in the former, he could gain nothing by the death of the horse." How-
ever, Illinois later dropped the distinction, requiring negligence in all cases. Johnson v.
Richardson, 17 Ill. 302 (1855).
SBEALE, THE LAW OF INNKEEPERS AND HOTELS (1906) c. i, § 6; c. I5, § 181; see Calye's
case, supra note I, at 33, where the stress is laid on the proposition that an innkeeper could




Again, viewed from the standpoint of expediency, such a distinction may antici-.
pate and check any tendency toward a "blanket" relaxation of the absolute liability
of the innkeper because of "hard" cases." The dictum of the court,12 however,
to the effect that the guest must prove negligence on the part of the innkeeper
goes further even than any American authority, the most lenient of which make
the innkeeper at least prima facie liable, with the burden of exonerating himself
by proving that the loss or injury was not due to his fault. 3 In view of the fact
that it is just as difficult for the guest to prove negligence in the case of injury
as in the case of theft, 4 and in view of the fact that the innkeeper with his lien
is in a better position than the ordinary bailee,' 5 the latter rule seems more
desirable.
BANKRUPTcY-RIGHT TO ENJOIN SALE BY PL.DGEE-Bankrupt had pledged
securities to a bank as collateral for a loan. The pledgee was given the power to
sell the collateral at will. After bankruptcy of the pledgor, the referee sought to
restrain the pledgee from selling the collateral. Held, that the pledgee could not
sell the pledged property without leave of the bankruptcy court. In re Henry,
5o F. (2d) 453 (E. D. Pa. 193i).
The United States Supreme Court recently held in Isaacs, Trustee v. Hobbs,'
that a court of bankruptcy could restrain foreclosure proceedings instituted after
bankruptcy-of the mortgagor. This ruling was founded upon the principle that
title to and control of the bankrupt's property vests in the trustee in bankruptcy,
and is thus placed under the exclusive custody of the bankruptcy court.2 A strong
practical reason motivates this stay of proceedings, where it is probable that a
greater surplus will be realized by the trustee over and above the liens, which will
accrue to the ultimate benefit of the general creditors.' On the contrary, if the
' It may be significant that at least three of the minority American jurisdictions had very
"hard" cases for their first impression. Cutler v. Bonney, supra note 7 (accidental fire);
Metcalf v. Hess, supra note 8; Merritt v. Claghor, 23 Vt. 177 (1851) (accidental fire).
For what may be a similar tendency towards relaxation in the case of common carriers,
cf. the recent case of Mercer v. Christiana Ferry Co., 155 Ati. 596 (Del. 1930), in which the
court refused to hold the carrier liable for the loss of an automobile sunk without its fault,
on the ground that there had been no delivery of the car, the plaintiff having merely driven
it onto the ferry.
At p. 657.
" Bowell v. Dewald, 2 Ind. App. 303, 28 N. E. 430 (1891). BEAz, op. cit. supra note 9,
§ I9on. 35.
11 JoNEs, BAILMENTS, *9!;-96; see Hulett v. Swift, 33 N. Y. 571, 572 (1865).
'Robins v. Gray [1895] 2 Q. B. 5o1.
'282 U. S. 734, 51 Sup. Ct. 270 (1931) ; cf. Straton v. New, Trustee, 283 U. S. 318, 51
Sup. Ct. 465 (ig3i) ; In. re Schulte-United, Inc., 49 F. (2d) 264 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931). It
has been suggested in the Pittsburgh Legal Journal (August 1, 1931), that Straton v. New
has a material bearing on the rule evolved in Isaacs v. Hobbs. It seems, however, that both
cases can be reconciled on the ground that in Straton v. New foreclosure proceedings were
commenced more than four months prior to bankruptcy, so that the state court first acquired
jurisdiction.
2 George B. Matthews & Sons v. Webre Co., 213 Fed. 396 (E. D. La. 1914) ; In re San
Gabriel Sanatorium Co., 1O2 Fed. 310 (C. C. A. 9th, i9oo); BLACK, BANKRUPTCY (4th ed.
1926) 1192.
3BANKRUPTCY Acr, 1898, §2, U. S. Coip. STAT. 1901, 3420; George B. Matthews &
Sons v. Webre Co., supra note 2, at 397; U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Bray, 225 U. S.
205, 32 Sup. Ct. 62o (1912) ; It re Booth, 96 Fed. 943 (D. C. Ga. 1899). BLACK, BANK-
RUPTCY (4th ed. 1926) 1192, "So also, where it appears that it would be for the interest of
the creditors at large to have mortgaged real estate taken by the trustee and administered
with the remainder of the assets, preserving the lien of the secured creditor, the court of
bankruptcy has jurisdiction to order the trustee to take possession of the property, and to
enjoin the secured creditor from selling it or otherwise interfering with it."
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unpaid mortgage lien greatly exceeds the market value of the property,4 permis-
sion to commence foreclosure proceedings is not withheld. The instant court
deemed the problem before it settled conclusively by the decision of Isaacs,
Trustee v. Hobbs. Considering that the factor of "control" was so strongly
emphasized in that case,5 an injunction against foreclosure upon realty might
co-exist with an unrestrained sale of personalty, since there is relatively a much
smaller degree of actual control over personal property in the bankruptcy court.
Courts have recognized this distinction, and many will not enjoin the pledgee in
the absence of fraud." In most instances where the bankruptcy court refrained
from intervention, the security was of lesser value than the amount of the lien.
7
One court, however, has intimated that even the possibility of the pledgee procur-
ing a surplus is immaterial." The opinion in the case at bar does not reveal the
value of the pledge as compared to the size of the lien, but in an earlier case which
likewise did not disclose that material fact, the pledgee was permitted to sell with-
out interference by the court.' 0 Practically, the only detrimental effect of restrain-
ing the sale is a delay for a reasonable period, during which the trustee may survey
the situation to prevent possible fraud and to seek the highest sales price." But
when it is considered that a pledgee, especially a bank, advances money upon a
pledge very often only because of the ease of liquidation, one must doubt the
wisdom of adopting such a rule, unless there is a sufficient excess in value above
the amount of the lien to protect adequately the pledgee, and it is clearly shown
that a material advantage will accrue from restraining the sale.
BANKRUPTcY-SURETYSHIP-PROVABILITY OF CONTINGENT LIABILITIES-
The indorser of a promissory note became bankrupt before the note became due.
The holder of the note filed a claim against the bankrupt estate. Held, that the
claim should be allowed since it was a "provable debt". Maynard, Administrator
v. Elliot, 283 U. S. 273, 51 Sup. Ct. 390 (1931).
"In re Schulte-United, Inc., supra note i, at 264; In re Parrino, 5o F. (2d) 611 (E. D.
N. Y. '93').
I Supra note I, at 737, 51 Sup. Ct. at 271.
"Mercer Nat. Bk. v. White's Executor, 236 Ky. 128, at 132, 32 S. W. (2d) 734, at 737
(193o), citing with approval Hiscock v. Varick Bk., 2o6 U. S. 2& (19o7), "The pledgee has
a special property in the thing pledged which entitles him to the possession, to protect which
he may maintain detinue, replevin, or trover, and the interest of the pledgor is not subject
to execution; and the bankruptcy court will not interfere with a sale by the pledgee of the
thing pledged, under power of sale given by the terms of his contract, when there is no claim
that such power is exercised in a fraudulent or oppressive manner." BLAcx, BANKRUPTCY
(4th ed. 1926) iig6.
' Mercer Nat. Bk. v. White's Executor, supra note 6, at 133; Griffin v. Smith, 177 Cal.
481, 171 Pac. 92 (1918) ; In re Peacock, 178 Fed. 851 (E. D. N. Car. 19io).
8 See Griffin v. Smith, supra note 7, at 483, 171 Pac. at 93, "But if, overlooking the de-
fective .form of pleading we take it as intended to aver that a substantial surplus above plain-
tiff's claim might be realized if the sale were postponed, the allegation is still insufficient.
The plaintiff, as pledgee, has a matured and present right to realize upon his security." But
cf. It re Cobb, 96 Fed. 821 (899) (pledgee must surrender the collateral to the trustee in
any case).
9 It seems to have been admitted by both parties that the collateral was worth more
than the amount of the lien.
"In re Mayer, 157 Fed. 836 (C. C. A. 2d, 19o7). This case also pointed out that the only
section of the Bankruptcy Act which referred to the disposition of collateral, § 57 (h), was
of no aid since it is almost universally conceded that this section only fixes a mo-le for evaluat-
ing the securities held by secured creditors.
' Thus, the trustee may be able to sell the pledged stock in conjunction with another
block of this stock which together constitute a controlling interest in a corporation. Con-
versely, in certain situations, by selling the pledged stock in small quantities, the trustee
may secure a better price by avoiding a glutting of the market.
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The instant case has quelled the dissension which has surrounded this point
since the passage of the present Bankruptcy Act.' This Act does not expressly
mention the provability of contingent liabilities, as did the previous act, which
provided that they should be provable debts.2 ' Many courts have held that con-
tingent liabilities are not provable debts under this new act. Some of these courts
base their decision on the reasoning that Congress meant to exclude such claims
by omitting mention of them,3 while others 4 rely upon their interpretation of
§ 63a of the Act, which section defines "provable debts". These latter courts
contend that subdivision 4 of this section, which lists as provable ". . . debts
founded upon an open account, or upon a contract express or implied," must be
considered in the light of subdivision I of the same section, which lists as provable,
"debts" which are "a fixed liability . . . absolutely owing at the filing of the
petition. . . ." The better opinion, however, follows the view that these sub-
divisions are distinct provisions, and independent of each other.5 Under this
interpretation contingent claims are provable even though they are not matured
at the "time of bankruptcy". This view has been adopted by the leading text
writers.' As has been pointed out by the court in the case of In re Buzzini &
Co.,7 the claim must be proven within the statutory period, but, as is frequently
the case in bankruptcy, the liquidation would be delayed until the maturity of the
claim. The holding of the instant case supports this view, yet the criticism
advanced by Holbrook 8 still seems applicable, ". . . it would be infinitely
better if the statute were so amended as to bring about this desirable result with-
out too great a strain upon the language of the act."
BILLS AND NOTES-NEGOTIABILITY-ENTRY OF JUDGMENT BEFORE MATU-
RITY WITHOUT STAY OF ExEcuTioN-Defendant issued a note payable ninety
days after date to B, containing a power of attorney to confess judgment "at any
time after the date, without stay of execution". The plaintiff, who was indorsee
of this note, obtained thereon a judgment which the defendant seeks to vacate.
Held, that the note being non-negotiable, the indorsement according to statute
was not sufficient to entitle the holder to enter judgment thereon. Wooleyhan v.
Green, 155 Atl. 602 (Del. i93i).
Most courts hold that a note which permits entry of judgment before matu-
rity is non-negotiable. 1 One reason given for this rule is that the due date is
indefinite.2 This conclusion is reached either on the ground that the note is
inconsistent in that at one place it states judgment can be entered immediately
and in another place it says the note is due in the future 3 or on the ground that
1 AcT OF JULY I, 1898, 30 STAT. 544 (I899), ii U. S. C. §§ 1-112 (1926).
2 AcT OF MARCH 2, 1867, 14 STAT. 517, 525 (1867) § i9.
3 See It re Mullings Clothing Co., 238 Fed. 58, 67 (C. C. A. 2d, i916) ; In re American
Vacuum Cleaner Co., 192 Fed. 939 (D. N. J. 1911).
'In re Roth v. Appel, 181 Fed. 667 (C. C. A. 2d, i9io) ; First National Bank v. Elliot,
19 F. (2d) 426 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927).
I Moch v. Market St. National Bank; io7 Fed. 897 (C. C. A. 3d, igoi) ; In re Smith,
146 Fed. 923 (D. R. I. 19o6).
02 RmiINGTON, BANKRUPTCY (3d ed. 1923) § 777; COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY (12th ed.
1921) 963.
7183 Fed. 827, 829 (S. D. N. Y. i9io).
8A Surety's Claim Against His Bankrupt Principal Under the Present Law (1912) 60
U. OF PA. L. REV. 482, 498.
'Volk v. Shoemaker, 229 Pa. 407, 78 AtI. 933 (I911) ; First National Bank v. Russel,
124 Tenn. 618, 139 S. W. 734 (1911); Muender v. Muender, 182 Wis. 417, 196 N. W. 773
(1924).
2 First National Bank v. Russel, supra note i.8See instant case at 6o4. Cf. (929) 78 U. OF PA: L. REV. 26o (inconsistency in amount).
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the due date is dependent upon the caprice of the holder.' A second reason given
is that the Negotiable Instruments Law 5 which provides that the negotiability of
an instrument is not impaired by a provision which permits a confession of judg-
ment at or after maturity, was meant to make a note of this nature non-negotiable.
Other courts,' however, hold that this section is not controlling and was meant
only to show some of the things which do not impair negotiability. A few courts
reach the conclusion that the note is negotiable by saying, either that the power
of attorney was not "authorized or contemplated by our law" and so was never
any part of the note,7 or, that though the power of attorney is non-negotiable the
note itself still remains negotiable.8 It has been suggested 9 that this type of
instrument is non-negotiable for commercial reasons since its circulation is
retarded by the fact that the due date is dependent on the whim of the holder.
The inconsistency of this view is seen in the fact that there are no commercial
objections to an ordinary demand instrument 10 or one due within a certain definite
period." Especially is this true where there is no provision "without stay of
execution" 12 since here the power is merely one of security and not for purposes
of execution before maturity. 1  There seems, however, to be two other reasons
for non-negotiability, one based on a social factor and the other on the intention
of the parties. The former is the desire of the courts to protect dependent bor-
rowers who have been driven to a harsh bargain. The latter is that it could not
have been the reasonable intention of the parties 1 that a note with such a pro-
vision should be negotiable since an inopportune entry of judgment by a stranger
would be likely to destroy the entire fabric of the maker's business.15
CONFLICT OF LAWS-CONTRACT OBLIGATIONS-EXTENT OF RECOVERY FOR
BREACH-Defendant contracted in Massachusetts to pay for his daughter's attend-
ance at plaintiff's school in Massachusetts for the full school year but withdrew
her in December, leaving unpaid the second term charges which, by the contract
terms, fell due in January and February. Plaintiff brought assumpsit in Michigan
for the entire amount unpaid. Held, that plaintiff could recover only compen-
satory damages, the Michigan remedy for breach of an executory contract.
Mlount Ida School for Girls v. Rood, 235 N. W. 227 (Mich. 1931).
'Wisconsin Yearly Meeting of Freewill Baptists v. Babbler, I15 Wis. 289, 91 N. W.
678 (i9o2). This is a principle which runs through negotiable instruments law for the
courts have always attempted to render non-negotiable all instruments, the due dates of which
are dependent on the caprice of the holder.
1N. I. L. § 5.
'Jones v. Turner, 249 Mich. 403, 228 N. W. 796 (930).
' Tolman v. Janson, io6 Ia. 455, 76 N. W. 732 (1898).
'Osborn v. Hawley, 19 Ohio 130 (I85o). Another court arbitrarily says that the time
is not so uncertain as to render the note non-negotiable. Gelbach v. The Carlinville National
Bank, 83 Ill. App. 129 (1898) (after or before passage of N. I. L.).
(1919) 32 HARv. L. REV. 747, 753; (1925) 3 Wis. L. REv. 105.
"N. I. L. §7.
IN. I. L. §4.
' See Johnson v. Phillips, 143 Md. 16, 22, 122 Adl. 7, 9, where the court held the note
non-negotiable even though this phrase was omitted.
" Shapiro v. Malarkey, 278 Pa. 78, 122 Atl. 341 (1923).
" Cf. Gray v. Gardner, 12 D. & C. 449 (Pa. 1929), where the court was influenced by
the intention of the parties; (1929) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 258.
" First inferred from Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa. 346 (1846).
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The law of the forum undoubtedly determines the remedy available to a
suitor,' but this rule is meaningless without restricting "remedy" to one of its
two common meanings,-the reparation for the wrong, or the mode of redress.'
It is in the latter sense 'that the word is now generally used in connection with
questions of conflict of laws.3  By the great weight of authority it is recognized
that the measure of damages for breach of contract is a matter pertaining to the
substance of the right and not to the remedy, and must be determined by the lex
loci,4 not by the lex furl.' Under the law of Massachusetts the promise in suit
would be construed as independent, and plaintiff would be permitted to recover
the full contract price.6 Since the validity of the contract was not in question, it
would seem that the only question before the court was the determination of the
measure of damages. The court, however, expressly excluded that question from
consideration and said the issue to determinate is the remedy open to plaintiff-his
right to reparation. 7  In determining what this "remedy" should be, the court
had to answer one question only-whether the promise to pay was dependent or
independent.8  This question is one of contract construction; 9 and the construc-
tion, or legal effect, of a contract, is determined by the lex loci contractus.10 In
ruling that this promise was dependent the court did not follow the Massachusetts
rules of construction,1 but relied on Michigan authority. 2 Thus even if it is
granted that a question of "remedy" is involved, the promise was independent
where made and hence the court should have granted full recovery which is its
remedy for the breach of an independent promise.
' Scudder v. Union Nat. Bank, 91 U. S. 406, 23 L. Ed. 245 (0875) ; Miller v. Hilton, 189
Mich. 635, 155 N. W. 574 (x9'5).
-'See GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws (927) I58; Note (193o) 14 MINN. L. Rxv. 665.
3 GOODRICH, Op. cit. sutr note 2.
4 Lex loci is used in this connection to nmean either the lex loci contractus or the lex. loci
solutionis in contradistinction to the lex fori.
"Atwood v. Walker, 179 Mass. 514, 61 N. E. 58 (igoi) ; Brown v. Camden etc. Ry., 83
Pa. 316 (1877) ; CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1931) § 396D; GOODRICH,
CONFLICT OF LAws (1927) 183; SEDGWICKC, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1912) 2758; Note (1930) 78
U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 640; (1930) 43 HARV. L. REv. 13o7. But see Wooden v. Western N. Y.
R. R., 126 N. Y. 10, 15, 26 N. E. 1oo, 1o51 (189I) ; cf (1909) 58 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 95, 98.
'International Textbook Co. v. Martin, 221 Mass. I, io8 N. E. 469 (0915). In con-
struing this type of promise the Massachusetts court applies the first rule of Serjeant Wil-
liams in his note to Pordage v. Cole, i Saund. 319, 32o, 85 Repr. 449, 451 (167).
'"Clearly the question is one of remedy only, not one relating to the measure of dam-
ages; and the remedy is governed by the lez fori." At page 229. The only explanation of
this language seems to be that the court used, in the same sentence, both meanings of the
word "remedy", and said, in effect, "the question is one of remedy (the right to reparation) ;
and the remedy (mode of redress or procedure) is governed by the ler for; therefore the
right to reparation is governed by the le~r for." The court experienced the same confusion
as to the meaning of "remedy" in School of Commerce v. Stroud, 248 Mich. 85, 226 N. W.
883 (929) ; criticised in Note (930) 14 MIN. L. REv. 665 and Note (193o) 78 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 640. Wiest, J., dissenting, recognized that the questibn was one of damages and
stated that the lez loci should prevail. The court was probably forced into the instant de-
cision by the holding in the Stroud case.
'The remedy-or measure of damages-in Michigan for the breach of an independent
promise is assumpsit on the promise: Natona Cash Register Co. v. Dehn, 139 Mich. 406,
io2 N. AV. 965 (9o5). The court was not confronted with a conflict of remedies of two
states.
'Loud v. Pomona Land & Water Co., 153 U. S. 564, 14 Sup. Ct. 928 (1893); Lippincott
v. Low, 68 Pa. 314 (871).
"°Walker v. Lovitt, 250 Ill. 543, 95 N. E. 631 (1911) ; Amos v. Kelley, 240 Mich. o57,
2,5 N. W. 397 (1927) ; CoN FLCT OF LAws RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. I931) § 376A.
' By statute in Michigan, the common law of a foreign state is a matter for judicial no-
tice: MICHIGAN ComP. LAws 1929, § 14181.
" International Textbook Co. v. Jones, 166 Mich.. 86, 131 N. W. 98 (gii).
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CONFLICT OF LAWS-TORTS-ACTION ON FOREIGN STATUTE-Plaintiff,
after paying compensation to X's beneficiaries, under a policy of compensation
insurance issued to X's employer, brought this action in 1930 in Maryland to
enforce liability for X's death in Texas in 1928. The applicable laws of Texas 1
and Maryland 2 differ as to: I. time limitation for bringing the action, 2. measure
of damages, 3. in whose name the action may be brought, 4. persons entitled to
sue, 5. compromise by the parties. Held, that plaintiff could not sue on the Texas
statute in Maryland because of dissimilarities regarding machinery provided for
enforcement. London Guarantee & Accident Co. et al. v. Balgowan S. S. Co.
et al., 155 Atl. 334 (Md. 1931).
American decisions differ as to the enforcement of a foreign death statute,
although few, if any, have denied the right to take jurisdiction in every circum-
stance. 3 Some courts predicate the right of recovery in the forum on the exist-
ence of a statute there similar to the one of the state where the injury occurred.4
This is but little more liberal than the English rule which allows recovery for a
tort only if the act is a tort by English law.5 Other decisions say that the foreign
statute will be enforced if it does not conflict with the public policy of the forum,6
giving no indication, however, of what "public policy" means. Many courts have
enforced foreign statutes dissimilar to their own.7 Some of the later cases are
more liberal in enforcing foreign statutes, saying that for the court to refuse
jurisdiction the foreign law must be contrary to the morals or the welfare of the
people of the forum8 These decisions, which are approved by leading text
writers,9 mark a step toward greater clarity and stability. The holding of the
instant case is in conformity with some authorities,"0 including a very recent
I TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. (1925) tit. 77, arts. 4671-4678 (death statute); ibid. tit. 130, art.
83o7, § 6a (compensation law).
I MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 67, pars. I and 2 (death statute); ibid. art. IO, par.
58 (compensation law).
'It is true that the court, in Hyde v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. R., 61 Iowa 441, 444, 16
N. W. 351, 352 (1883) said, "Even where a right of action is given by a statute of the state
where the injury occurred, it has been held that no court, except those of such state, can
enforce the law." But in Boyce v. Wabash R. R., 63 Iowa 70, i8 N. W. 673 (1884), the same
court, however, criticized the former statement and expressly decided that a cause of action
arising under the statutes of one state, could be enforced in another if the two statutes were
similar.
"Tex. & Pac. R. R. v. Cox, 145 U. S. 593, 12 Sup. Ct. 905 (1892); Burrel v. Flem-
ing, iog Fed. 489 (C. C. A. 5th, i9ol).
Phillips v. Eyre, L. R. 4 Q. B. 225 (1869).
'Burns v. Grand Rapids R. R., 113 Ind. i69, 15 N. E. 230 (1888); Van Doren v. Penn-
sylvania R. R., 93 Fed. 26o (C. C. A. 3d, 1899).
'It has been held that the following differences will not defeat the jurisdiction: (I)
Measure of damages, Southern R. R. v. Decker, .5 Ga. App. 21, 62 S. E. 678 (igo8). (2)
Limitation of damages, Hanna v. Grand Trunk R. R., 41 IllI. App. I6 ('89'). (3) Persons
entitled to sue, Wooden v. West. N. Y. & Pa. R. R., 126 N. Y. 10, 26 N. E. 1050 (1891).
Contra: Lower v. Segal, 59 N. J. L. 66, 34 Atl. 945 (1896) ; cf. Matheson v. Kansas City,
Ft. S. & M. R. R., 61 Kan. 667, 60 Pac. 747 (1900) (jurisdiction defeated because of dif-
ferences in damages coupled with penal characteristics of foreign statute, plus differences in
persons). (4) Time limitation, Weaver v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 21 D. C. 499 (1893).
On the other hand, jurisdiction has been refused because there was no death statute in
the forum, Texas & Pac. R. R. v. Richards, 68 Tex. 375, 4 S. W. 627 (1887) ; also because
the foreign state would not reciprocally enforce the death statute of the forum, Wabash R. R.
v. Fox, 64 Ohio St. 133, 59 N. E. 888 (I9OI).
' Dennick v. Cent. R. R. of N. 1., 1O3 U. S. II (i88o) ; Lauria v. E. I. du Pont de Ne-
mours & Co., 241 Fed. 687 (E. D. N. Y. 1917) ; Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., 224
N. Y. 99, 12o N. E. 198 (1918) (leading case); CoNstIcr OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (Am. L.
Inst. 1931) § 620.
IGooDmcIr, CONFLICT OF LAWS (927) 209; MINOR, CoNIFLic OF LAWS (1901) 493;
STORY, CoFLIcT OF LAWS (8th ed. 1865) § 625, n. a.
" CoxFICT OF LAwS REsTATF--ENT, supra note 8, at § 631. See Note (1931) 79 U. OF
PA. L. RLv. 1112.
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Pennsylvania case 11 where, as here, the time limitation that applied to death
statute suits in the forum had elapsed.12  The language of the decision, however,
seems to indicate that the result would have been the same even if the suit had
been brought within the time limitation of the forum, and hence to all intents and
purposes the court is still adhering to an extremely conservative view.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER TO THE
PEOPLE-An act,' providing for jury service by women, contained a provision for
a general referendum before it might take effect. At the election specified, a
majority of the votes cast was in favor of the proposition. Held, that the act
was unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative power. People ex rel. Thomp-
son v. Barnett, 176 N. E. io8 (Ill. 1931).
It is usually said that the law-making power of the legislature cannot be
delegated to any other body or authority,2 since the constitution vests that right
in the legislature alone.3  Most courts hold that this rule renders statutory pro-
visions requiring the approval of the electorate before a measure becomes a law
invalid.4 Justice Holmes, however, in a dissenting opinion, has suggested that
since the legislature is the agent of the people, "it is allowed to exercise its dis-
cretion by taking the opinion of its principal if it thinks that course to be wise." 5
Frequently, laws applicable to a particular restricted locality are distinguished
from those of a general character and held valid.' These local option laws,
though their enforcement is dependent upon the approval of the voters of the
locality affected, are considered measures of local self-government which the
constitution is to be construed as permitting.' Some courts affirm the non-
delegability of legislative power to the people, but avoid the conclusion that a
popular referendum is unconstitutional by saying that the law is in fact made by
the legislature, that it is merely the enforcement which is conditional upon a
'Rosenzweig v. Heller, 302 Pa. 279, 153 Atl. 346 (1931).
' The general Statute of Limitations of Texas places the time limitation at two years, TEx.
REv. Civ. STAT. (1925) tit. 91. The Maryland death statute says the action must be brought
within one year, MD. ANN. CODE, supa note 2, at art. 67, par. 2.
'ILL. R.Ev. STAT. (Cahill, 1929) 161.
2 1 CooLEY, CoNsTiTuTIoNAL LImITATIoNs (8th ed. 1927) 224. An important exception
is with reference to the delegation of powers to local governments. The rule of non-dele-
gability has also been qualified to permit the granting of discretionary authority to executive
and administrative officers to determine when and how the powers legislatively conferred are
to be exercised, or the manner in; which the requirements of the statutes are to be met and
the rights therein created to be enjoyed. 3 WILLOUGHBY, CoNsvrUTIOiNAr LAW OF THE
U. S. (2d ed. 1929) 1636-37. For history and scope of general rule, see Duff and Whiteside,
Delegata Potestas Non Potest Delegari (1929) 14 CoRN. L. Q. 168.
' IL.. Co-TsT. OF 1870, art. 4, § I.
Opinion of the Justices, 16o Mass. 586, 36 N. E. 488 (1894) ; Barto v. Himrod, 8 N. Y.
483 (1853) ; WILLOUGHBY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1651.
Dissenting opinion in Opinion of the Justices, sup-ra note 4, at 594. This view is en-
dorsed by CooLEY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 239n.
'WILLOUGHBY, op. cit. supra note 3, at I652n; OBERHOLTZER, REFERENDUM, ImTrATIv
AND RECALL iN AERmlCA (1912) 2OO. Local option laws are held valid in People ex rel.
Unger v. Kennedy, 2o7 N. Y. 533, ioi N. E. 442 (1913) ; Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. R. Co. v.
Commissioners, i Ohio St. 77 (1853) ; Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. 491 (1873). Contra: Rice v.
Foster, 4 Harrington 479 (Del. 1847).
The argument advanced is that since the system of local self-governments is so deeply
rooted in our political philosophy, antedating the adoption of constitutions, the principles of
local self-government were intended to be incorporated into these constitutions by general
implication. For an exposition and destructive criticism of this theory, see McBain, The
Doctrine of an Inherent Righe of Local Self-Government (I916) 16 CoL. L. REv. 19o, 299.
From his conclusions it follows that the distinction mentioned between laws of local applica-
tion and those of a general character is false.
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favorable vote of the people." Although the enforcement of legislation can be
made contingent upon some designated future occurrence,9 it would seem that a
popular vote cannot be construed as such a contingency, 10 since the substance of
the transaction is that the law ultimately owes its force to the votes of the people.
The instant case, which rejects the contingency theory, is in accord with the
majority view in regard to the reference of legislation to the approval of the entire
electorate of the state.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE PREss-The defend-
ant newspaper was enjoined from further publication, in accordance with a
statute,' because in certain previous issues it had accused certain city officials of
inefficiency and of complicity in crime with gangsters. Held, that the statute was
unconstitutional, as an invasion of the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment, since it imposed a restraint prior to publication. Near v. Minnesota,
283 U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625 (1931).
It becomes increasingly obvious that constitutional guaranties in an organized
society are not of absolute rights 2 but the perplexing question still remains which
limitations upon those guaranties are proper and which improper. Thus, punish-
ment for contempt of court,' and the exclusion of obscene,' fraudulent,, seditious,6
and defamatory' matter from the mails have been judicially declared not to
violate the freedom of speech and the press. The constitutionality of a given
restriction would seem to involve vague considerations of social utility and expe-
diency, as affected by the elastic factors of time and place.8 In the instant case
the Court, while recognizing the legitimacy of the above limitations, takes as its
thesis that the liberty of speech and the press is within the general guaranty of
liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment,9 and subscribes to Blackstone's definition
8 People ex rel. Kennedy; Locke's Appeal, both supra note 6; State v. Parker, 26 Vt.
357 (1855).
1 The Brig Aurora, 17 Cranch 382 (U. S. 1813) ; Home Ins. Co. v. Swigert, 104 Ill. 653
(1852).
" Brauner v. Supervisors, 141 Md. 586, 19 Atl. 250 (1922) ; Opinion of the Justices;
Barto v. Himrod, both supra note 6. Note the result reached in Santo v. State, 2 Iowa i6s
(1885), where the court held that the provision making enforcement contingent upon a pop-
ular referendum was unconstitutional, but that the rest of the act was valid, and in force
when approved by the governor. Is this not contrary to the obvious intent of the legislature?
'Session Laws of Minn., 1925, c. 285: "Any person who shall publish, etc. . . . a
malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical is guilty of
a nuisance, and all persons guilty of such nuisance may be enjoined, as hereinafter pro-
vided".
2 Gitlow v. N. Y., 268 U. S. 652, 45 Sup. Ct. 625 (924) ; State ex rel. LaFollette v.
Kohler, 200 Wis. 518, 228 N. W. 895 (i93o) ; CoRwIr, THE CoNSTITUTION AND WHAT IT
MEANs TODAY (I930) 95; Goodrich, Does the Constitution Protect Free Speech? (1921) 19
MIcE. L. REv. 487.
' Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 27 Sup. Ct. 556 (I9o6) ; Dale v. State, x98 Ind.
110, i50 N. E. 781.
'Tyomies Pub. Co. v. U. S., 2II Fed. 38.5 (C. C. A. 6th, 1914); Clark v. United States.
211 Fed. 916 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914).
Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 24 Sup. Ct. 789 (1903).
' Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 246 Fed. 24 (C. C. A. 2nd, I917).
'Warren v. United States, 183 Fed. 718 (C. C. A. 8th, i9io).
' Thus, the various Espionage Acts, which were passed during the late war, were uni-
formly upheld. Debs v. U. S., 249 U. S. 211, 39 Sup. Ct 252 (i918) ; Schaefer v. U. S., 251
U. S. 466, 39 Sup. Ct. 259 (1919) ; Schenck v. U. S., 249 U. S. 47, 39 Sup. Ct. 247 (I918).
' Principal case at 707.
RECENT CASES
thereof,10 i. e. there shall be no restraint prior to publication. This decision,
taken together with that in the recent case of Stromberg z. California," which
held unconstitutional a statute making it a felony inter alia to display a red flag
as a symbol of opposition to organized government, would seem to indicate a
consistency of liberal Weltanschauung in the personnel of the present Supreme
Court bench. In that case the Court pointed out that it is a privilege of citizens
of the United States to offer, and to teach the doctrine of, opposition to organized
government, so long as violence is not employed or counseled.12 The principal
decision commends the adverse criticism of public officials as being of great social
utility, 3 a view which is consistent with the most advanced social principles.
14
Although these two recent cases :- are by no means a definitive exegesis of the
constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and the press, they go a long way
toward giving the non-conformist in public affairs, who may be as "high-minded
and patriotic as his more conservative neighbor, at least a peace-time voice in the
public forum.'6
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-NEV TRIAL-FUNCTION OF APPELLATE JURISDIC-
TION-Defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree. The Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment, although two of the five justices concluded that the
trial court had erred in the decision of questions of law arising during the course
of the trial, and a third judge decided that there was error in instructing the jury.
The defendant was granted a rehearing. Held, that the judgment should be
reversed. State v. Le Duc, 300 Pac. 919 (Mont. 1931).
Several cases declare the primary purpose of an appellate tribunal is the
determination of each assignment of error as it is brought before the court.'
Each specification involves a separate/and distinct point of law and must neces-
sarily be settled upon its own merits. The judgment will be reversed only if a
majority of the justices agree upon some particular ground for new trial. On
the other hand, the greater number of the cases take the view of the principal
case and hold that the main function of an appellate court is to decide upon the
correctness of the verdict.2  The assignments of error are considered as a whole,
and if the majority of the court conclude that the trial court erred, the judgment
will be reversed.3 But this obviously leads to curious consequences. The judge
at the second trial may be required to decide on the same questions as were pre-
sented in the first trial. Since a majority of the appellate justices found that the
"Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the
public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is
improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the consequence of his own temerity". 4 BL.
Comm. *151; principal case at 72o, 51 Sup. Ct. at 632.
U283 U. S. 359, 51 Sup. Ct. 532 (1931).
At 369, 51 Sup. Ct. at 535; see CHAFFEE, FREE0no OF SPEz CH (1920) 2O9 et seq.
"At 719, 51 Sup. Ct. at 632.
2-Veeder, Freedom of Public Discussion (1910) 23 HARv. L. REv. 413.
For an interesting discussion of the principal case and the Stromberg case, see Foster,
The rg3x Personal Liberfies Cases (1931) 9 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 64.
"Note (1916) U. OF PA. L. REv. 170.
'In re McNaughton's Will, 138 Wis. 179, 118 N. W. 997 (19o9); Cook v. Drew, 3
Stew. & Port. 392 (Ala. 1833) ; see Legal Tender Cases, 52 Pa. 9, IOI (1866). See the dis-
senting opinion in Browning v. State, 33 Miss. 47 (1857).
' Browning v. State, supra note i; Smith v. United States, 30 U. S. 292 (1831) ; Pollock
v. Hennicke Co., 64 Ark. 18o, 46 S. W. 185 (1897).
'"I believe that each of the majority members should have applied the rule that 'a wrong
reason for a decision does not invalidate it' (Ebaugh v. Burns, 65 Mont. 15, 24, 210 Pac. 892,
896 (1922)) to the decision of the other, and thus become the actual majority without yielding
the honest conviction of any one of them to a mere rule of procedure." Matthews, 3., in prin-
cipal case at p. 937.
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trial judge ruled correctly on each point he is bound to render his decisions
exactly as before, and again there would be ground for reversal.4  The view is
most paradoxical for, in effect, the appellate court is declaring that the trial judge
did not err, and at the same time is reversing the judgment. But, as the court
in the instant case points out, this is to be preferred to the condemnation of
defendant, who might be innocent, to twenty-five years' imprisonment.
EQUITY-BUILDING RESTRICTIONs-TERMINATION BY ACQUIESCENCE-
L_&cHEs-Plaintiff brought a bill in 1930 to enjoin defendant from erecting a
new church on lots a short distance from plaintiff in a plan of 395 lots restricted
to dwellings until i944. Defendant had built a temporary wooden structure in
1922 and has used it since as a church without objection. In 1927 and 1928
defendant published notices of an intended larger brick building. Plaintiff ob-
jected in 1928, but defendant's pastor secured over ioo waivers by residents and
started excavations. The lower court enjoined the erection of the new structure,
but permitted the present one to remain. Held, that defendant should not be
enjoined in the erection of the brick building. Cherry v. Board of Home Missions
of Reformed Church, 236 N. W. 841 (Mich. 1931).
Building restrictions, provided they are reasonable and do not unduly hinder
the free alienation of property, are enforced by the courts.1 These restrictions
may forbid the erection of churches,2 as well as other structures 3 Equity will
not interfere to enforce restrictive covenants when conditions in the locality are
altered.' Nor will it enforce covenants where the general plan has been aban-
doned.5  Other available defenses are those of acquiescence 6 and laches.7  A
complainant may not obtain equitable relief when his conduct in not objecting to
a violation may fairly be construed as an acquiescence to it,' but this acquiescence
will not destroy his right to obtain an injunction preventing an extension of the
violation.' Similarly acquiescence to one violation will not be construed as
acquiescence to another.'0 In the instant case therefore it cannot be said that
there was an acquiescence in the erection of the permanent structure, particularly
since it was larger. The defendant, however, had the additional defense of
" As said by Handy, J., in his dissenting opinion in Browning v. State, supra note I, "such
would be the strange and anomalous attitude of the case, ad infinituim, as often as it should
be tried below, and brought here under the same state of facts."
'Compton Hill Improvement Co. v. Strauch, 162 Mo. App. 76, 141 S. W. 1159 (I9,1);
Thompson v. Diller, 161 App. Div. 98, 146 N. Y. Supp. 438 (1914).
IScott Co. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Ore., 83 Ore. 97, 163 Pac. 88 (1917) ; John-
son v. Mt. Baker Park etc. Church, 113 Wash. 458, 194 Pac. 536 (192o). Contra: Tucker
v. Immanuel Baptist Church, ii Kan. 30, 237 Pac. 654 (1925) ; see Mechling v. Dawson,
234 Ky. 318, 32, 28 S. W. (2d) 18, 19 (1930).
3Thompson v. Langan, 172 Mo. App. 64, 154 S. W. 8o8 (1913) (hotel); Hepburn v.
Long, 146 App. Div. 527, 131 N. Y. Supp. 154 (91) (private garage); Chambers v. Foley,
245 Pa. 164, 91 Ati. 350 (1914) (theater).
" Boston Baptist Social Union v. Boston U., 183 Mass. 2o2, 66 N. E. 714 (193) ; Bates
v. Logeling, 137 App. Div. 578, 122 N. Y. Supp. 251 (i9io); Starkey v. Gardner, 194 N. C.
74, 138 S. E. 408 (1927).
rLoud v. Pendergast, 2o6 Mass. 122, 92 N. E. 40 (910) ; Sanford v. Kerr, 8o N. J. Eq.
240, 83 Atl. 225 (1912).
' Sayers v. Collyer, L. R. 28 Ch. Div. 1O3 (1884).
Orne v. Friedenberg, 143 Pa. 487, 22 Atl. 832 (IgoI) ; Loud v. Pendergast, supra note
5; 2 HIGH, INJUCTIONS (4th ed. i9o5) § 1159.
'Landell v. Hamilton, 177 Pa. 23, 35 At. 242 (1896) ; Note (1926) 74 U. OF PA. L REV.
312.
9Leaver v. Gorman, 73 N. J. Eq. i29, 67 Atl. I1 (19o7) ; Hohl v. Modell, 264 Pa. 56,
Io7 Atl. 885 (1919).
' Schadt v. Brill, 173 Mich. 647, 139 N. W. 878 (1913).
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laches." On this ground the decision is a proper one, since after making one
oral objection, the complainant remained silent about a year and a half concerning
his rights and allowed the defendant to make expenditures and to incur liabilities.
PROPERTY-SUBTERRANEAN WATERS-DISTINCTION BETWEEN PERCOLAT-
ING AND FLOWING WATER-Plaintiffs, who had sunk wells to obtain water from
an underlying artesian basin, sought an injunction to restrain defendants from
boring more wells and thereby lessening the flow from plaintiffs' wells. An
Idaho statute I provided that "the right to the use of waters of (public 2) rivers,
streams, lakes, springs, and subterranean waters may be acquired by appropri-
ation." Held (one judge dissenting), that the defendants would be enjoined.
Hinton v. Little, 296 Pac. 582 (Idaho 1931).
The early English case of Acton v. Blundell,3 which decided that a landowner
had an absolute right to the use of all subterranean water found under his land,
was not popular. New York courts qualified the uses to which percolating water
could be put.4 Other states announced the "American" doctrine of correlative
proportionate use.5 In addition, almost all jurisdictions further limited Acton v.
Blundell by holding that it applied only to water percolating through the ground
without any certain or established course, and not to well-defined subterranean
streams. 6 This distinction became so common that when Western courts were
called upon to interpret their statutes regulating water rights, the majority 7 held
that the right of "appropriation", that is, the right of the first user of water to
have his supply uninterrupted by others, applied only to streams and not to per-
colating water. Idaho, however, departed from this rule in the present case and
held that since there was some motion, more or less, in all subterranean water, the
same law should be applied in both cases. If the best interests of an arid state
are served by allowing the appropriation of running water, the same should be
true of percolating water," so it would seem that the Idaho court has reached the
most practical conclusion. Furthermore the decision is certainly only a fair inter-
pretation of the meaning of the statute. The dissenting judge bases his opinion on
the proposition that water percolating beneath the ground is the private property
of the landowner and is therefore not affected by the statute, which refers to pub-
lic waters. There is, however, no reason why percolating waters should be more
nWhitney v. Union Rwy. Co., i Gray 359 (Mass. 1858); Soifer v. Stein, 1oi Pa.
Super. 135 (i3i); 2 HIG1, 1oc. cit. supra note 7.
'Idaho Comp. Stat. (919) 5558., Rev. Code 3242.
: Although the word "public" is not included in this section, the court apparently feels
that it is meant, as other sections do include it, which are closely related to this section.
Comp. Stat. (1919) 5569.
S12 M. & W. 324 (1843).
'One is entitled to use percolating water for any beneficial purpose connected with the
land itself. Smith v. Brooklyn, 18 App. Div. 340, 46 N. Y. Supp. 141 (897)
IKatz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 70 Pac. 663, aff'd 74 Pac. 766 (1903) ; Meeker v.
City of East Orange, 77 N. J. L. 623, 74 AtI. 379 (19o9) ; Schenk v. City of Ann Arbor, 196
Mich. 75, 163 N. W. 1O9 (1917).
'Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Cline, 37 Fla. 586, 2o So. 780 (i8gi) ; Clinchfield Coal Co.
v. Compton, 148 Va. 437, 139 S. E. 308 (927). This is the view of Pennsylvania, which
holds that the doctrine of Acton v. Blundell does not apply to streams, and that it does not
apply where the defendant has shown malice or negligence. Brown v. Kistlir, 19o Pa. 499,
42 Atl. 885 (1899) ; Collins v. Chartiers Valley Gas Co., 131 Pa. 143, 18 Atl. 12 (189o).
Howard v. Perria, 200 U. S. 71, :26 Sup. Ct. 195 (1905) ; McKenzie v. Moore, 2o Ariz.
1, 176 Pac. 568 (1918); Crescent Mining Co. v. Silver King Mining Co., 17 Utah 444, 54
Pac. 244 (I898). Contra: Bower v. Moorman, 27 Idaho 162, 147 Pac. 496 (1917) ; cf. Sulli-
van v. Northern Spy Min. Co., iI Utah 438, 40 Pac. 7o9 (1895).
' Katz v. Walkinshaw, supra note 5, gives a very good criticism of the unsoundness of the
English rule from an economic viewpoint.
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private than a stream flowing under the same ground. It is no more a lasting
part of the realty; both types of water flow freely from one position to another.
To start with such a basis is really assuming what he has attempted to prove, that
there is a distinction between percolating and flowing water.
TAXATION-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-GIFTS CONCLUSIVELY DEEMED IN
CONTEMPLATION OF DETH-Plaintiff applied for a refund of taxes paid on
gifts made within two years of the death of the donor. The tax was imposed
under a section of the federal estate tax I which provides that certain transfers
without consideration, made within two years before death, "shall be deemed in
contemplation of death." Held, that the provision establishing this conclusive
presumption was unconstitutional. Hall v. White, 48 F. (2d) io6o (D. Mass.
1901).
In a number of recent district court cases 2 the constitutionality of this clause
has been attacked and in each instance it was held unconstitutional. In Schles-
inger v. Wisconsin 3 the Supreme Court of the United States, by a divided bench,4
held a six year presumption to the same effect, an arbitrary classification of gifts
inter vivos in violation of the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.5 In its majority opinion the Supreme Court did not mention the rather
lengthy period of time within which this presumption operated as bearing on its
decision, but some weight was no doubt attributed to it." There can be little
question that even under a two year statute gifts will be subject to the estate tax
which were actually not made in contemplation of death. In the exercise of the
police power, however, legislation has often been upheld the operation of which
necessarily included innocent articles or transactions within the prescribed class. 7
A similar latitude should be granted to the exercise of the taxing power if, without
being too arbitrary, it would aid in the proper administration of inheritance tax
legislation. The great difficulty in proving that gifts are made in contemplation
of death 8 is attested by the fact that ten states and the federal government found
it necessary to pass laws establishing irrebuttable presumptions to that effect and
REvNuE Act, 1926, § 3o2(c), 26 U. S. C. A. § io94(c).
2Donnan v. Heiner, 48 F. (2d) io58 (W. D. Pa. ig3i) ; Estate of Henry A. Guinzberg,
U. S. Daily, Aug. 4, I93i at i28o; Delaware Trust Co. v. Handy (D. Del.) U. S. Daily,
Sept. 2, 1931, at 1514; cf. State Tax Commission v. Robinson, 234 Ky. 415, 28 S. .W. (2d)
491 (930).
3270 U. S. 230, 46 Sup. Ct. 26o (1926).
"Holmes, Brandeis, Stone, dissenting.
I§ i-". . nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."
I "If the time were six months instead of six years I hardly think that the power of the
state to pass the law would be denied, as the difficulty of proof would warrant making the
presumption absolute; and while I would not dream of asking where the line should be
drawn . . ., yet since we are dealing with a matter of degree, you must realize that reason-
able men may differ widely as to the place where the line should be drawn." Holmes dis-
senting in Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, supra note 3.
Purity Extract Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. r92, 33 Sup. Ct. 44 (1912) ; Silz v. Hesterberg,
211 U. S. 31, 29 Sup. Ct. 10 (19o8). Contra: Weaver v. Palmer, 270 U. S. 402, 46 Sup. Ct.
320 (1926).
8 In the case of Matter of Mills, 172 N. Y. App. Div. 530, 158 N. Y. Supp. Iioo (i916)
gifts made by Mills when he was eighty-four years old and in failing health were held net
in contemplation of death, although he died ten days later. In Matter of Spreckles, 3o Cal.
App. 363, 158 Pac. 549 (i916) gifts made by a seventy-nine year old woman, suffering from
a dangerous heart disease, were held not in contemplation of death, although she died a month
later.
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seventeen others passed legislation establishing rebuttable presumptions., The
judgment of such a number of legislative bodies should not be overlooked in
determining the constitutionality of statutes setting up presumptions of contem-
plation of death."0
TAXATION-SITUS OF STOCK OWNED BY NoN-RESIDENTS-A Minnesota
statute 3 imposed a transfer tax on stock of corporations of that state whether
owned by residents or non-residents. Decedent died a resident of Wisconsin
owning stock in Minnesota corporations. His administrators petitioned to have
this stock exempted from the tax. Held, that the petition should be denied
since the situs of the property interest represented by the stock was still within
the jurisdiction of Minnesota. - Benson v. State, 236 N. W. 626 (Minn. 1931).
A long line of both state a and federal 4 decisions sanctioned a transfer tax
on stock of domestic corporations owned by non-residents. The recent case of
Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, however, decided that such a tax on
bonds was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 6 because the situs of the
bonds was at the domicile of the creditor 7 under the maxim mobilia sequuntur
personain. The argument stressed by the court was the economic evil of double
'Conclusive presumptions were established in: Ariz., Ark., Colo., Ky., Miss., Mo., N. C.,
N. D., Tenn., Wis. Rebuttable presumptions in the following: Conn., Del., Ga., Ind., Kan.,
La., Mass., Mich., Mont., N. J., N. Y., Ohio, S. C., Utah, Va., W. Va., Wyo. PINKERTON
& MILLSAPS, INHERITANCE AND ESTATE TAXES (1926) § 139.
An appeal on the instant case is now pending. FEDERAL & NEW YORK STATE INcOME
AND INHERITANCE TAXES AFFECTING ESTATES AND TRUSTS, July Supp. 7 (1931).
"'MINN. STAT. (I MASOI9 1927) §§ 2292, 2302.
2 For a discussion of the theories of a stock transfer tax refer to Note (1925) 38 HARV.
L. Rav. 8o9. But see Rhode Island Hospital v. Doughton, 270 U. S. 69, 46 Sup. Ct. 256
(1926).
'Matter of Bronson, 15o N. Y. I, 44 N. E. 707 (1896) ; Greves, Exr. v. Shaw et aL, 173
Mass. 205, 53 N. E. 372 (1899) ; McDougald v. Lilienthal, 174 Cal. 698, 164 Pac. 387 (91W).
The stock has even been considered subject to the tax when the deceased has pledged it as
collateral security for a loan with a creditor outside the taxing state where the question was
whether the will transferred the stock itself or only a right to redeem it. Matter of Hallen-
beck, 231 N. Y. 4o9, 132 N. E. 131 (1921) ; Security Trust Co. v. Edwards, go N. J. L. 558,
ioi Atl. 384 (1917) ; Larson v. MacMiller, 56 Utah 84, 189 Pac. 579 (1920). The fact that
a corporation was chartered in two states did not relieve the stock owned by a decedent in
a third state from a transfer tax. Moody v. Shaw, 173 Mass. 375, 53 N. E. 891 (1899).
Some cases seem to hold otherwise but they can be distinguished on the grounds of the
reciprocity clauses of exemption incorporated in the statutes. Bliss v. Bliss, 221 Mass. 201,
log N. E. 148 (1915) ; Kansas v. Davis, 88 Kan. 849, 129 Pac. 1197 (1913).
4Tappan v. Merchants National Bank, 86 U. S. 49o (1873) ; Corry v. Baltimore, 196
U. S. 466, 25 Sup. Ct. 297 (i9o.5) ; Hawley v. Malden, 232 U. S. I, 34 Sup. Ct. 201 (1914).
'280 U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98 (1930) [overruling Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189,
23 SUp. Ct. 277 (903)]. See Note (1930) 15 CORN. L. Q. 457. See also Baldwin v. Mis-
souri, 281 U. S. 586, 5o Sup. Ct 436 (193o) ; (1930) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 9g.
"A state may not tax property beyond its jurisdiction. State Tax on Foreign Held
Bonds, 82 U. S. 30o (1872); Louisville & Jeffersonville Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U. S.
385, 23 Sup. Ct. 463 (io3); Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, igg U. S. 194, 26
Sup. Ct. 36 (1905). For recent developments see NoSSAXAN, The Fourteenth Amendment
in its Relation to State Taxation of Intangibles (1930) 18 CALIF. L. REv. 345; Note (1926)
74 U. OF PA. L. REV. 73; Note (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 532.
7Quoting from the case of State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, supra note 6, "... debts
can have no locality separate from the parties to whom they are due". See dissenting opinion
of Justices Holmes and Brandeis; Note (I93O) 9 ORE. L. REV. 370; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1926) 85.
8Note (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REV. 532, 536; PowELI., Extra-Territorial Inheritance
Taxation (1920) 20 CoLr L. REV. I, 283, 300 et seq. Powell suggests that where the applica-
tion of this maxim would result in double taxation it is disregarded. See Southern Pacific
Railway v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63, 32 Sup. Ct. 13 (1911).
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taxation.9 It was contended in the principal case that this same reasoning applied
to stocks also. Such would seem to be the case, but it is well settled that there is
a fundamental difference between a corporate bond and a share of stock,10 based
on the fact that the corporation is a creature of the state subject to the right of
the state to impose on the stockholders, whether residents or non-residents, the
duty of paying taxes on the transfer of the stock as a condition to becoming
stockholders." Bondholders are merely creditors whose only interest is in the
payment of an obligation, while stockholders own undivided interests in corporate
property. Granted that the stock is taxable at the situs of the corporation, the
argument of multiple taxation may be directed against a tax imposed by the state
where the owner is domiciled, but it is fundamental that the situs of such intangi-
bles is at the domicile of the owner with respect to which he must contribute to
the support of the government whose protection he enjoys.12 It is therefore
suggested that since the right of the state of incorporation and of the domicile
of the owner is well established on sound legal bases, 13 double taxation of capital
stock will not soon be eliminated.
TORTS-LBEL-DICTATION TO STENOGRAPHER AS PUBLICATION-One
count in an action for libel and slander alleged that defendant dictated a letter,
accusing plaintiff of larceny, to his stenographer, who read and transcribed the
notes; and that the letter was mailed to plaintiff. Defendant pleaded that the
count did not state a cause of action for libel. Held (three judges dissenting),
that the facts alleged were sufficient to constitute a cause of action for libel.
Ostrowe v. Lee, 256 N. Y. 36, 175 N. E. 505 (I93I).
A leading English case, Pullman v. Hill,' held that the dictation of defama-
tory matter to a stenographer effected the actionable publication of a libel. A
later case created the distinction that where the communication would be privi-
leged if made directly to the addressee by the person dictating, the privilege covers
its dictation to a stenographer in the usual course of business.2  This case has
been repeatedly followed 3 and, with Pullman v. Hill, represents the English law.
' The court reasoned that the general principles which prohibited taxation of tangibles
except where they are located applied equally well to intangibles. It went on to state that
because of the national scale of business and the enormous increase in the investment of
wealth of negotiable securities that such interests should be.protected from oppressive taxa-
tion. It is suggested that the legal ground for the decision was the concurring opinion of
Justice Stone who declared the tax in question was a tax on the act of transfer which could
only be done where the decedent was domiciled, and that no state could impose such a tax
except where the act was done.
'0 Matter of Bronson, supra note 3.
" Corry v. Baltimore; Tappan v. Merchants National Bank, both supra note 4; Beale,
Jurisdiction to Tax (ii) 32 HARV. L. REV. 587, 6o2. There are, however, several cases
where the distinction between bonded indebtedness and shares of stock in a corporation owned
by non-resident of the taxing state was overlooked. Gilbertson v. Oliver, 129 Iowa 568, 105
N. W. loo2 (i9o6) ; Kintzing v. Hutchinson, Fed. Cas. #7834 (1877).
Hawley v. Malden, supra note 4; Wright v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 195 U. S. 219, 25
Sup. Ct. I6; see So. Pac. v. Ky., 222 U. S. 63, 68, 32 Sup. Ct. 13, i5 (1911) ; COOLEY, TAXA-
TION (4th ed. 1924) § 462.
'Supra note 2.
'[i89i] i Q. B. 524.
-Boxsius v. Goblet Frres, [1894] I Q. B. 842. In this case, the defendant was a solici-
tor, and the Court held that, as such, it was part of his duties to write defamatory letters at
the request of his clients, and customary for solicitors to use stenographers in so doing. The
fact that stenographers are required by their employers to keep such matters confidential was
probably a factor in the decision.
'Edmonston v. Birch & Co., [1907] I K. B. 371; Roff v. British & French Chem. Mfg.
Co., [I918] 2 K. B. 677; Osborn v. Thomas Boulter & Son, [193]o 2 K. B. 266. Note (1902)
22 CAN. L. T. 321.
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In the instant case, this question of privilege was not raised. The leading
American case, Gambrill v. Schooley," adopted the rule in Pullnlan v. Hill and
has been followed in several jurisdictions.5 A large number of American cases,
however, have held that where the person dictating and the recipient of the dicta-
tion are both servants, or agents, of a corporation, acting within the scope of
their employment, the transaction is a "single act" of the corporate body, and
does not constitute a publication by the corporation.8 Although some authorities
maintain that the dictation effects the publication of a slander, and not of a libel,
7
the courts, on the whole, have ruled that it does publish a libel." It was the
opinion of the Court in the instant case that the libel was not published until the
stenographer read over the notes 0  It would seem to follow, therefore, that if
the stenographer, after taking dictation, neither read nor transcribed the notes,
the wrong would not be a libel.10 It is certain, however, that the instant case has
given greater significance to the advice of Esher, M. R., in Pullman v. Hill, which
was cited with approval, "If a merchant wishes to write a letter containing
defamatory matter, and to keep a copy of the letter, he had better make the copy
himself."
TORTS-PROXIMATE CAUSE-CARRIER'S DUTY TO FORESEE INTERVENING,
INDEPENDENT, WRONGFUL ACT OF A PASSENGER-Plaintiff's son was killed
when a defective coupling joining the defendant's cars broke. The severance
was caused by another passenger who, while crawling through a transom above
a door, inadvertently applied the air brake. Held, that the negligence of defend-
ant in failing to inspect and remedy the defective coupling was the proximate
cause of the boy's death. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Ballew et ux., 39 S. W.
(2d) i8o (Tex. 193).
Those courts which apply the foreseeability test to the question of proximate
cause, as the court did in the principal case, have repeatedly held that the inter-
' 93 Md. 48, 48 Atl. 730 (i9oi).
'Nelson v. Whitten, 272 Fed. 135 (E. D. N. Y. 192I) ; Ferdon v. Dickens, i6i Ala. i81,
49 So. 888 (igog) ; Sun Assurance Co. of Can. v. Bailey, 1oi Va. 443, 44 S. E. 692 (i9o3).
But cf. Globe Furniture Co. v. Wright, 265 Fed. 873 (D. C. 1920). (1921) 70 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 133.
,Owen v. Ogilvie, 3o App. Div. 465, 53 N. Y. Supp. 1033 (1898) (the leading case);
Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Jones, IS Ga. App. 414 (1916) ; Cartwright-Caps Co. v. Fischel &
Kaufman, 113 Miss. 359, 74 So. 278 (1917). Contra: Berry v. City of N. Y. Ins. Co., 2io
Ala. 369, 98 So. 29o (1924) ; Sun Assurance Co. of Can. v. Bailey, supra note 5. The same
result could have been achieved in these cases, presumably, if the rule in Boxsius v. Goblet
Frres, supra note 2, had been applied.
'ODGErs, LIBEL & SLANDER (4th ed. 1904) 154; SALMOND, ToRTs (7th ed. 1928) 530.
"It is difficult to see how A can publish to B a document which is written by B himself."
SALMOND, ibid. In the instant case, Cardozo, C. J., says of this reasoning, 256 N. Y. at 39,
175 N. E. at 505, "The criticism would be just if B were the author of the document, or
wrote it of his own volition."
'Pullman v. Hill, sapra note I; Boxsius v. Goblet Fr~res, supra note 2; Gambrill v.
Schooley, supra note 4. Contra: Angelini v. Antico, [1912] 31 N. Z. 841; see Osborn v. Boul-
ter, sutpra note 3, at 237. In the instant case the Court ruled that the stenographer served
merely as "an instrument to give existence to the writing" composed and dictated by the de-
fendant, and that the libel was published just as surely as if the defendant himself had writ-
ten the notes and given them to the stenographer to read and transcribe.
v At 38, 175 N. E. at 505. "Publication there still is as a result of the dictation, at least
where the notes have been examined or transcribed."
"This would, presumably, effect the publication of a slander if the stenographer grasped
the significance of the statement during dictation. However, as the Court sugested at 39, 175
N. E. at 5o6, "Very often a stenographer does not grasp the meaning of the dictated words
until the dictation is over and the symbols have been read." Of course, if the stenographer
did not read the notes, nor understand the defamatory significance of the dictation, neither a
libel nor a slander would be published.
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vening,' independent, 2 wrongful ' act of a third person does not relieve the first
wrongdoer of liability, where such act was foreseeable.4  In one case where a
motorman negligently left a street car unguarded upon an incline, the release of
the brake by a passenger was held to be foreseeable and thus, not destructive of
the chain of causation.5 Here, the interference by the passenger was one of the
very risks involved in the motorman's conduct.' But in the absence of other
proof of negligence the sudden application of an air brake,* or the unhooking of
a coupling,8 or the swinging of a brake handle 9 by a passenger has been held to
be unforeseeable. Thus on the basis of these cases, if the release of the air brake
alone had caused the injury in the principal case, there would have been no lia-
bility because such act was unforeseeable."0 Consequently in applying the fore-
sight test to causation in the instant case, logic would compel one to admit that
the passenger's act could not have been foreseen, thus destroying the chain of
causation. Obviously, this is an undesirable conclusion and the court avoided
it by reasoning that the application of the air brake was foreseeable and that it
was not necessary to foresee the wrongful application. In effect this is really
deciding the issue of negligence and not of cause, and has been a familiar expe-
dient in circumventing the foreseeability rule when applied to causation." It
would seem to be better to employ the method that several writers and many cases
'The court in the principal case called the application of the air brake by the passenger a
"concurrent" cause. Such a use of the phrase is either supported by the fiction that the defend-
ant's negligence in failing to inspect and remedy the defective coupling continued up unto the
very moment of the injury; or else, it is used as a word of art to denote a cause which cre-
ates joint liability. It seems more logical, however, to say that defendant's failure to inspect
and remedy was antecedent negligence creating a condition upon which the third person's
intervening act operated to produce the injury. The distinction is important in differentiating
the situation in the instant case from that: (a) where the two acts operate together, in point
of time, to produce the injury, and (b) where the third party's act precedes the defendant's
negligence, as in the case where a passenger dislodged a trolley pole, and the motorman at-
tempted to replace it without giving warning to another car coming around a curve. Blan-
chette v. Holyoke Ry. Co., 175 Mass. si, 5s N. E. 481 (1899).
' An independent, intervening act as distinguished from a dependent act, is one which is
not in response to a previous act or condition created by another. It is more difficult to fore-
see an independent, intervening act since a dependent act is more likely to be the very risk
involved in the defendant's antecedent negligence. Kliebenstein v. Iowa Ry. & Light Co., 193
Ia. 892, 188 N. W. 129 (1922).
' Whether or not the application of the brake, in the principal case, was wrongful, pre-
sents an interesting question. Since the third party, at the time he pulled the brake cord,
was in a part of the train where he had no privilege to be, his status was that of a trespasser.
And as such it would seem that anything done by him, even though accidentally, was still
wrongful.
'Gonzales v. City of Galveston, 84 Tex. 3, 19 S. W. 284 (1892) ; Lane v. Atlantic Works,
iii Mass. 136 (1872).
'Kliebenstein v. Iowa Ry. & Light Co., supra note 2.
' Supra note 2.
7 McDonnell v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 54 N. Y. S. 747 (1898).
'Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Storey, 37 Tex. Civ. App. 156, 83 S. W. 852 (1904).
'Sure v. Milwaukee Ry. & Light Co., 148 Wis. 1, 133 N. W. io98 (1912).
10 To hold otherwise would require a carrier to place such safeguards around its emer-
gency air brakes as would render them ineffective for the very purpose ior which they were
installed, namely, to be applied by the proper employees when a quick stop was necessary.
"One of the most usual means of obviating this test is to say that the exact conse-
quences do not have to be ;foreseen, but only harm in general. Strange to say, few courts have
seen any inconsistency in making such a substitution. . . .. What the courts actually do
when they make this switch is to abandon foreseeability as a test of causal relation altogether
and to fall, back upon the issue of negligence for which the general foreseeability test is
properly used." Green, Are Negligence and "Proximate" Cause Determined by the Samw
Test. (1922) I TEx. L. REv. at 443.
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have suggested, namely, that foresight determines the existence of negligence
and that the causal relation is a matter of fact for the jury.12
TRUSTS-=.PRECATORY Wo~Rs-DIRECTIONS TO ENIPLoY-A petition was
brought to construe a will. The will, after establishing a trust, stated, inter alia,
"It is my desire that my present housekeeper continue as such for my son."
Held, that although no trust existed in favor of the housekeeper, the guardian
must continue her status as long as possible. In re Platt's Will, 237 N. W. io9
(Wis. 193).
Where precatory language is employed courts are generally confronted with
the problem of whether the particular words give rise to a trust or whether they
merely express a wish.' Situations are rarer where precatory language is used
to direct the administration of an expressed trust,2 as in the instant case where the
precatory words were used in connection with a direction to employ. Testa-
mentary directions to employ have been grouped into three categories: (i) mere
recommendations; (2) express directions; and (3) express directions primarily
intended for benefit of the designated person.3 Mere recommendations are not
binding 4 and even mandatory instructions are not construed to give the designated
individual power in his own right to compel employment where he is only an
incidental beneficiary.' And in cases falling under the third class only two
instances have been encountered where the courts compelled the trustee to
employ.6 Aside from the special reasons applicable in cases involving the appoint-
ment of attorneys, 7 this fact may be attributed to the infrequent use of clearly
mandatory language to employ 8 and the hesitancy of courts to give mandatory
' Bohlen, The Probable and Natural Consequences as the Test of Liability in Negligence
(i9oi) 49 U. OF PA. L. REv. 79; Green, op cit. supra note 11, 243-60, 423-45; GRN, RA-
TIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927) especially pp. 177-85.
'In the absence of something in the terms of the will from which the court ought to
infer that a trust is intended, precatory words are generally interpreted only in their ordinary
sense. In re Humphrey's Estate (i916) i Ir. R. 21; Estate of Browne, 175 Cal. 36i, i65
Pac. 960 (917). Contra: Deacon v. Cobson, 83 N. J. Eq. 122, 89 At. IO29 (1914) ; In re
Hochbrunn's Estate, 138 Wash. 415, 244 Pac. 698 (1926).
' Precatory language has been sufficient to direct the sale of real estate, Appeal of the
City of Philadelphia, Trustee, 112 Pa. 470, 4 At. 4 (1886) ; to effectuate a gift, Mosley v.
Bolster, 201 Mass. i35, 87 N. E. 6o6 (I9O9) ; to direct the investment of a trust, Stewart v.
Stewart, 6i N. J. Eq. 25, 47 Atl. 633 (igoo).
" Scott, Testamentary Directions to Employ (928) 41 HAnv. L. REV. 709.
'Shaw v. Lawless, 5 Cl. & Fin. i29 (Eng. 1838) ; Finden v. Stephens, 2 Ph. 142 (Eng.
1846) ; Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown, IO5 Conn. 261, 135 AtI. 555 (1926) ; In re Will of Pit-
tock, io2 Ore. I59, i99 Pac. 633 (92).
Scott, op. cit. supra note 3, at 713; see Shaw v. Lawless, supra note 4, at 255.
Hibbert v. Hibbert, 3 Mer. 68I (Eng. 18o8) ; Williams. v. Corbet, 8 Sim. 349 (Eng.
1837).
'There is no testamentary power to control the trustee or executor in the choice of their
attorneys. it re Ogier, ioi Cal. 381, 35 Pac. goo (1894) ; Matter of Caldwell, 188 N. Y.
115, 8o N. E. 663 (907). Contra: Rivet v. Battistella, x67 La. 766, 120 So. 289 (2929).
The reason for the general holding is to be found in the fact that when an attorney is em-
ployed to render services in procuring the admission of a will to probate, or in settling the
estate, or in advising the trustee, he acts as the attorney of the executor or trustee and not
of the estate, and this personal relationship with its attaching liabilities cannot be imposed by
the testator.
8 But if the testator, clearly for the benefit of the designated person, demanded his em-
ployment as long as the services were satisfactorily rendered, it seems the court should grant a
decree for specific performance, although it has been argued in Scott, Control of Property
by the Dead (1917) 65 U. OF PA. L. REv. 527, 632, 65i, that it might well be against public
policy to permit the deceased to hamper the administration of an estate.
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significance to precatory directions to employ.9 The court in the principal case
held that although the housekeeper was only an incidental beneficiary it would
nevertheless require the guardian to continue her status as long as it was to the
best interests of the son who was the primary beneficiary, on the ground that the
testator's intention that his precatory language have mandatory effect should be
carried out."0 The case in result appears to go a step beyond the present line
of decisions, for there has been a marked tendency to give precatory words only
their natural meaning, both in instances like the present, and in cases where the
precatory language attempts to create a trust.1 It would appear, however, that
the courts may with less compunction determine that precatory language was
intended as an absolute direction, than to determine that precatory words were
intended to cut down a definitely expressed prior bequest and thereby set up a
whole series of new legal relations.
WILLS-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-DEDUCTION OF DEBT FROM LEGACY-
The decedent, by his will, gave his property to his nine children, share and share
alike. The estate included three unpaid promissory notes against three chil-
dren,-to which the Statute of Limitations could be pleaded. Held, that the
debts of the legatees were deductible from their distributive shares. In re Lind-
meyer's Estate, 182 Minn. 607, 235 N. W. 377 (931).
An actionable debt owing by a legatee to the decedent is deductible from the
distributive share of such legatee.' On the question whether a debt on which
suit has been barred by the Statute of Limitations can be deducted, the courts are
divided. The English rule,2 which has been adopted in a majority of the states,'
allows it to be deducted on the theory that the statute bars only the remedy and
not the debt itself.4  In the instant case the court asserts that it is inequitable to
let the distributee get his full share when he is already holding part, because he
thus unfairly diminishes the other shares. Whether or not this is inequitable
rests on a deeper question, rarely discussed by the courts,-what is the intent of
the decedent?' It is uniformly held, as pointed out above, that testators do not
' In the following cases the courts held that the testamentary expressions were not man-
datory directions: Jewell v. Barnes' Adm'r, Iio Ky. 329, 61 S. W. 36o (igoi) ("I desire") ;
In re Will of Pittock, supra note 4 ("It is my wish . . . it is my request") ; Finden v.
Stephens, supra note 4 ("My wish and desire") ; Shaw v. Lawless, supra note 4 ("It is my
particular desire that") ; Foster v. Elsley, ig Ch. D. 518 (Eng. i88i) ("I declare that").
"o It would seem that by compelling the housekeeper's employment the court forces a
personal relationship on the 6hild, but the decision is not to be criticized on this score for the
testator's right to appoint a housekeeper or governess for his child should be as uncontro-
verted as his right to name a guardian for the child.
' I PERRY, TRuSTS AND TRusTEEs (6th ed. 1929) par. I14; In re Humphrey's Estate,
supra note I; and cases collected, supra note 9.
'Brokaw v. Hudson's Ex'rs, 27 N. J. Eq. 135 (1876) ; Sharp v. Wightman, 2o5 Pa. 285,
54 Atl. 888 (19o3).
'Courtenay v. Williams, 3 Hare 539 (Eng. 1844) ; Rose v. Gould, i5 Beav. I89 (Eng.
1852) ; Coates v. Coates, 33 Beav. 249 (Eng. 1864).
'Holmes v. McPheeters, 149 Ind. 587, 49 N. E. 452 (1898) ; Lietman's Ex'r v. Lietman,
149 Mo. 112, .50 S. W. 307 (1899) ; Armour v. Kendall, 15 R. I. 193, 2 Atl. 311 (1885).
Contra: Allen v. Edwards, 136 Mass. 138 (1883) ; Holt v. Libby, 8o Me. 329, 14 AtI. 2O
(1888) ; Light's Estate, 136 Pa. 211, 20 Atl. 536 (189o).
'For a discussion of this phase of the case, see note on the principal case in (1931) 15
MIN N. L. REV. 590.
'In Holt v. Libby, supra note 3, at 332, 14 Atl. at 202, the court did stress intention:
"Observation leads us to believe that a testator is more likely to intend to remit than to col-
lect such debts, when nothing is declared of them in his will, especially debts against his
children and relatives. In many instances such claims are covered by the dust of time and
forgotten, though found by executors after the death of the testator."
RECENT CASES 14'
intend, by legacies to debtors, to release actionable debts.6 If the evidence shows
that in the particular testator's mind, the barrable debt was regarded as an actual
indebtedness, the courts, to be logical, should carry out their rule of construction
of intention, and hold the debt deductible. If the evidence shows that the debt
was not regarded as an actual one, the opposite result should be reached. 7 The
proximity of the date of the debt to the date of the will may aid in determining
the intention of the decedent.8  In the absence of evidence, it seems that the
courts should be guided by the attitude of the ordinary testator. It therefore
seems that the rule to be applied should be based on the reasonable intention of
the testator, and should not merely be based on the Statute of Limitations since
that is a statute of policy and not of intenw-,n.
'Brokaw v. Hudson's Ex'rs, Sharp v. Wightman, both supra note i.
'For example, if the will was made long after the debt has become barrable, the de-
cedent has either forgotten the debt, or remembering it, has failed to mention it in his will.
In either case, it appears probable that he did not intend to have the debt deducted.8 Holt v. Libby, supra note 3.
